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THE NEED FOR A NEW, UNIFORM STANDARD:
THE CONTINUED THREAT TO INTERNET-
RELATED STUDENT SPEECH
I. INTRODUCTION
The tragic events of September 11, 2001,1 the massacre at Columbine
High School,2 the bombings in London, and the current war in Iraq all
have one thing in common: they all involve acts of horrific violence. As a
result of these events, one cannot help but conclude that the world today
presents many grave dangers. The tragedy at Columbine High School
created perpetual fear amongst educators and students that another
unsuspected, horrific event like Columbine could happen again.
Exacerbating this fear are statistics that indicate, for example, that every
year about "85,000 Americans are wounded by firearms 'with teens
representing a disproportionate[] . . . number of the perpetrators and
victims."' 5 Furthermore, in 2002, 659,000 violent crimes including rape,
sexual assault, robbery, aggravated assault, and simple assault involved
student-victims and occurred while on school property.6 Also, in 2003,
thirty-three percent of students in grades nine through twelve reported
1. See Shawn Boyne, Law, Terrorism, and Social Movements: The Tension Between Politics
and Security in Germany's Anti-Terrorism Legislation, 12 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 41, 75-
76 (2004) (stating that members of the al Qaeda terrorist group bombed the twin towers of the
World Trade Center and attacked the Pentagon).
2. See Jerome H. Ehrlich, Columbine-Type Threats Raise Safety and Discipline Issues, 229
N.Y.L.J. 16, 16 (2003) (explaining that on April 20, 1999, two students killed their fellow
classmates and teachers at Columbine High School).
3. 3rd Roundup: Scotland Yard Catches Chief Terror Suspect, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-
AGENTUR, July 27, 2005 (stating that fifty-six people died and seven hundred people were injured
on July 7, 2005 when London's public transport system was bombed); see also 7 July 2005
Bombings, WIKIPEDIA THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA, available at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/7-July.2005_London-bombings.
4. Ehrlich, supra note 2, at 16.
5. Preston M. Browning, Jr., Struggling for the Soul of One's Country: American
Pathologies and the Response of Faith, CROSS CURRENTS, Jan. 1, 2005, at 80.
6. J.F. DEVOE ET. AL., U.S. DEP'TS OF EDUCATION AND JUSTICE, INDICATORS OF SCHOOL
CRIME SAFETY: 2004 10 (2004), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/iscs04ind.pdf.
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being in a fight either on or off campus.7 In addition, from 1993 to 2003,
about seven to nine percent of students reported being threatened or injured
with a weapon, such as a gun or knife, while on school property.8
Children's constant exposure to violent images on television, video games,
and movies is another cause for concern. 9
Helping to perpetuate this fear of violence amongst children, courts
have ruled in favor of schools in cases where students allegedly threatened
to commit violent acts against school administrators, teachers, and
students. 10 This Comment will focus on Internet-related student speech
cases. " The primary issue addressed in Internet-related student speech
cases is whether the school violated the student's First Amendment 12 rights
when it disciplined the student for posting allegedly vulgar, violent, or lewd
material on the Internet unrelated to any school-sponsored activity or
event.' 3 Many of these cases cited the Columbine tragedy to support the
proposition that schools must be given greater authority to effectively
minimize violent student behavior.' 4  However, the problem with the
holdings of Internet-related student speech cases is that they address a
misplaced fear. Although American society is violent, tragic events like
Columbine and September 1 th are infrequent.' 
5
Presently, there is a risk that students' First Amendment rights will be
infringed 16 because courts are placing too much emphasis on the
7. Id. at 18.
8. Id. at 16.
9. KEVIN W. SAUNDERS, SAVING OUR CHILDREN FROM THE FIRST AMENDMENT 44
(Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 2003).
10. Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, Columbine Fallout: The Long-Term Effects on Free
Expression Take Hold in Public Schools, 83 B.U. L. REV. 1089, 1091 (2003) [hereinafter
Richards & Calvert].
11. The phrases, "Internet-related student speech cases" or "Internet-related student speech"
refer to only those cases involving student speech and the Internet, and do not involve school-
sponsorship of the student's website or the student's Internet-related activity.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
13. See discussion infra Part III. (discussing the various Internet-related student speech
cases).
14. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
15. Richards & Calvert, supra note 10, at 1110; see also Theresa Walker, The 'Found'
Generation, ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, Jan. 5, 2004, at Life, etc. 1 (stating that since the 1970s
the overall rate of violent youth crime has actually declined in Orange County); see also DEVOE,
supra note 6, at 1 (stating that between July 1, 1999 through June 30, 2000, "there were thirty-
two school-associated violent [student] deaths in the United States.").
16. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Students Do Leave Their First Amendment Rights at the
Schoolhouse Gates: What's Left of Tinker?, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 527, 528 (2000) (stating that since
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District was decided, schools have won
practically every constitutional claim involving students' rights to free speech); See id. at 529
("There simply are hardly any Supreme Court cases in the past thirty years protecting students'
THE NEED FOR A NEW, UNIFORM STANDARD
Columbine tragedy without considering the well-known adage, "kids will
be kids." Additionally, there have been conflicting standards among the
lower courts 17 because the United States Supreme Court has not revisited
the issue of student speech rights, let alone Internet-related student speech
rights, since 1988.18 Due to these conflicting standards, there is a lack of
uniformity amongst the decisions rendered by the lower courts. Whereas
one court might hold that a student's Internet-related speech should be
restricted, another court, looking at the same set of facts but using a
different standard, might decide that the same student's Internet speech
should be protected. 19 As a result, schools and students have very little
guidance when trying to determine what type of speech is protected.
Courts must ensure that Internet-related student speech will receive some
form of protection, because the Internet is a unique medium, offering
anonymity and allowing people to easily exchange ideas at the click of a
button.2°
This Comment argues that a new standard is needed for Internet-
related student speech cases that do not involve any school-sponsorship of
the Internet-related activity. Part II gives background on the U.S. Supreme
Court's evolving standards regarding student speech. Part III discusses
several recent state and federal cases that apply the U.S. Supreme Court's
standards regarding student speech. Part IV argues that a separate, uniform
standard is needed for Internet-related student speech cases. Part V
presents the new standard for Internet-related student speech cases. Part VI
applies this new standard to the Internet-related student speech case, J.S. v.
Bethlehem Area School District ("J.S. I/").21 Part VII concludes that the
U.S. Supreme Court must set a new standard for Internet-related student
speech cases because both the lower courts and the public need guidance in
this area of law.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF STANDARDS REGARDING STUDENT
SPEECH
Three landmark U.S. Supreme Court decisions that articulate the
constitutional rights.").
17. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
18. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
19. Chemerinsky, supra note 16, at 542 (stating that lower federal courts have not followed
a consistent pattern regarding student speech-some have been protective of student speech while
others have been restrictive of student speech); see also id. at 543 (pointing out that circuits have
decided cases differently from each other even though these cases involve nearly identical facts).
20. See discussion infra Part W.E.
21. J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002) [hereinafter J.S. II].
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standards regarding student speech must be discussed in order to
understand why a new standard is -needed for Internet-related student
speech: Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,
22
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,23 and Hazelwood School District
v. Kuhlmeier.
24
A. The Tinker Standard
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District25 is a
pivotal 1969 U.S. Supreme Court decision regarding student speech. Three
students, John F. Tinker, Christopher Eckhardt, and Mary Beth Tinker
decided to publicize their objections to the Vietnam War by wearing black
armbands to school. 6 The school, forewarned of the students' plan,
instituted a policy, which stated that a student who wore "an armband to
school would be asked to remove it."'27 If the student refused, then the
student would be suspended until the student returned to school without
wearing the armband. 8 These three students wore the black armbands at
school and were subsequently suspended.2 9  After the suspension, the
students sued the school district.
30
Faced with the issue of whether the school's disciplinary actions
violated the students' First Amendment speech rights, the Tinker Court
ruled in favor of the students, stating that "[i]t can hardly be argued that
either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.",31 Finding that this symbolic
speech did not interfere with the school's work or interfere with the rights
of other students to be left alone,32 the Court formulated what is now
known as the "substantial disruption test., 33 The "substantial disruption
22. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
23. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
24. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
25. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
26. Id. at 504.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506; id. at 505-06
(classifying the speech as "pure speech," thereby entitling it to full protection under the First
Amendment).
32. Id. at 508. Contra id. at 518 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Even a casual reading of the
record shows that this armband did divert students' minds from their regular lessons, and that
talk, comments, etc., made John Tinker 'self-conscious' in attending school with his armband.").
33. Id. at 513; Alexander G. Tuneski, Note, Online, Not on Grounds: Protecting Student
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test" states that the First Amendment does not protect speech that
"materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion
of the rights of others. 34 Furthermore, "undifferentiated fear.., of [a]
disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of
expression."
35
Another limitation that the Tinker Court placed on the authority of
schools to prohibit speech was that schools had to show that their actions
were prompted by more than a mere desire to avoid unpopular
viewpoints.36 As a result of applying these limitations and the "substantial
disruption test," the Court held that wearing the armbands would not
substantially interfere with the functioning of the school nor interfere with
students' rights.3 7
The Tinker Court emphasized the importance of students' rights to
free speech. 38 Although the Court recognized that the school's urgency in
banning the wearing of armbands was based on a wish to avoid the
Vietnam War controversy-a controversy that had incited protest marches
against the war and draft card burnings 39-the Court stated that state-
operated schools cannot be "enclaves of totalitarianism. 'Ao The Court also
stated that "[s]chool officials do not possess absolute authority over their
students," and that in the absence of a constitutionally valid reason for
regulating student speech, students are entitled to express their views.4 1
Additionally, the Court observed that to train future leaders, the country
Internet Speech, 89 VA. L. REv. 139, 147 (2003); Renee L. Servance, Comment, Cyberbullying,
Cyber-Harassment, and the Conflict Between Schools and the First Amendment, 2003 Wis. L.
REv. 1213, 1226 (2003) (stating that the "substantial disruption test" has also been called the
"material disruption standard"); see, e.g., J.S. 17, supra note 21, at 867-69 (applying the
substantial disruption test).
34. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
35. Id. at 508.
36. Id. at 509; see, e.g., Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1180
(E.D. Mo. 1998) (using the Tinker holding to conclude that for school officials to justify a
prohibition of a certain expression, the school "must be able to show that its action was caused by
something more than a mere desire to avoid... discomfort").
37. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509-10 (noting that the school district did not prohibit students
from wearing all controversial symbols such as the Iron Cross-a traditional Nazi symbol-
which some students wore to school without protest).
38. See id. at 512-13; see also Servance, supra note 33, at 1226 ("The key to the Tinker
holding is that absent a showing by the school of a valid reason for restricting student speech,
schools must allow students to exercise their constitutional right to free speech.").
39. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 510 n.4; Louis Freedberg, Editorial, Back to Vietnam, S. F. CHRON.,
Oct. 4, 2004, at B6 (noting that Vietnam War protests were continuous and they "reached their
peak at UC Berkeley and hundreds of other campuses around the United States in 1970").
40. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
41. Id.
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must encourage a "robust exchange of ideas" through a "multitude of
tongues," instead of through an "authoritative selection" of sorts. 42 These
ideas are in accord with the "marketplace of ideas" theory, which states that
more open discussions about particular issues increases the likelihood that
the truth may be obtained.43
A notable law professor, Erwin Chemerinsky, points out that Tinker is
based on three main principles concerning the First Amendment and
schools: (1) student speech is constitutionally protected, (2) schools are
allowed to punish expression only if there is a substantial disruption, and
(3) the courts have an important role in making sure that students are
punished only if this standard is met.44 He argues that such "themes have
been totally absent from subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decisions and
most lower court cases involving student speech. ''45 The following is a
discussion of the subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decisions regarding
student speech.
B. The Fraser Standard
In 1986, the U.S. Supreme Court limited the extent of the Tinker
decision in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser.46 The Fraser case
involved a student named Matthew N. Fraser who delivered a sexually
suggestive nominating speech at a school election assembly.47 According
to a counselor at the school assembly, "some students hooted and yelled" in
reaction to the speech, while others were "bewildered and embarrassed. 48
As a result, the school suspended Fraser for three days and removed his
name from the list of candidates to speak at graduation.49
In response to this punishment, Fraser sued the school district
claiming that his First Amendment rights had been violated.50 The district
court ruled in favor of Fraser, holding that the school's rule against
42. Id. at 512.
43. SAUNDERS, supra note 9, at 30.
44. Chemerinsky, supra note 16, at 545.
45. Id.
46. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
47. Id. at 677-78; see also id. at 687 (illustrating how Fraser's speech incorporated sexual
innuendos, such as, "'Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary,
he'll take an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn't attack things in spurts-he drives hard,
pushing and pushing until finally-he succeeds."').
48. Id. at 678.
49. Id.; see also id. at 679 (stating that Fraser was allowed to return to school after serving
two days of suspension).
50. Id. at 679.
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disruptive conduct was vague and the removal of the student's name from
the list was a constitutional violation. 51 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the judgment and held that Fraser's speech was
indistinguishable from the speech in Tinker.52  The U.S. Supreme Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision. 3
The U.S. Supreme Court made a distinction between the political
message involved in Tinker and the sexually suggestive speech involved in
Fraser.54 The Court departed from the Tinker decision by stating that the
freedom to advocate controversial views must be balanced by society's
interest in teaching students socially appropriate behavior. 5 Narrowing the
scope of students' constitutional rights, the Court stated that "the
constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings., 56 Furthermore, the
Court emphasized that the school board had the authority to determine what
manner of speech was inappropriate in the classroom or at a school
assembly.57  The Court-influenced by precedent that recognized a
compelling governmental interest in protecting children from sexually
explicit, indecent, or lewd speech 58 -held that threatening or highly
offensive speech had little value at schools and schools may limit such
speech.59 Overall, the Court was deferential to school authorities and
allowed them to prohibit speech that undermined the school's educational
51. Id.; see id. at 692 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that Fraser, a young man with a good
academic record, was in a better position to determine whether an audience of his peers would be
offended by a sexual metaphor "than [ ] a group of judges who are at least two generations and
3,000 miles away from the scene of the crime").
52. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 679; see also Fraser v. Bethel Sch.
Dist. No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356, 1361 n.4 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating that there was "no evidence in the
record indicating that any students found the speech to be offensive").
53. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 680.
54. Id. (distinguishing between using lewd and obscene speech to nominate someone and
the wearing of armbands as a form of protest).
55. Id. at 681 ("Even the most heated political discourse in a democratic society requires
consideration for the personal sensibilities of the other participants and audiences."). But see id.
at 692 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("As the Court of Appeals noted, there 'is no evidence in the
record indicating that any students found the speech to be offensive."').
56. Id. at 682.
57. Id. at 683.
58. Id. at 684; see id. at 689 n.2 (Blackmun, J., and Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that
Fraser's speech "was no more 'obscene,' 'lewd,' or 'sexually explicit' than the bulk of programs
currently appearing on prime time television or in the local cinema").
59. See Servance, supra note 33, at 1228 (citing Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685); id. at
123 1 ("Fraser allows schools to regulate speech deemed inappropriate for the school setting, even
when the same speech is protected outside of school.").
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60mission.
The Fraser decision indicates that the U.S. Supreme Court made a
noticeable departure from its decision in Tinker. While the Tinker Court
emphasized students' rights to express their views freely, the Fraser Court
stated that the freedom to advocate unpopular views had to be balanced
against society's interest in teaching students appropriate behavior.
61
Essentially, the Fraser Court gave school officials the constitutional
authority to punish students for vulgar or lewd speech, even though that
same speech, if made by an adult, would be protected outside the school's
62gates. One rationale for the Court's departure from Tinker is that
traditional First Amendment analysis was inappropriate for the school
setting.63
The impact of the Fraser decision continues to be felt long after the
Court issued its decision. 64 Some lower courts have applied the Fraser
decision to student expression that is school-sponsored, whereas others
have applied the decision to any student speech that is considered vulgar or
lewd. 65 According to one legal scholar, Fraser allows schools to prohibit
vulgar and lewd speech at school-sponsored functions.66
C. The Kuhlmeier Standard
The U.S. Supreme Court continued to limit the Tinker decision with
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.67 In Kuhlmeier, three students,
who were staff writers on their school newspaper, filed an action against
the Hazelwood School District for violating their First Amendment rights.68
60. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685-86 (noting that it was appropriate for a school to disassociate
itself from vulgar or lewd speech if it was inconsistent with the fundamental values of public
school education).
61. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512-13 (stating, in
part, that students should be able to express their opinions at school, even on controversial
subjects like the Vietnam War); see Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681; see also Carol M. Schwetschenau,
Note, Constitution Protection for Student Speech in Public High Schools: Bethel School District
No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986), 55 U. CIN. L. REv. 1349, 1364 (1987).
62. Schwetschenau, supra note 61, at 1364.
63. Id. at 1365-66.
64. David Hudson, Matthew Fraser Speaks Out on 15-Year-Old Supreme Court Free-
Speech Decision (April 17, 2001),
http://www.freedomforum.org/templates/document.asp?docunentlD= 13701 (stating, for
example, that several years after the Fraser decision, Fraser, now a debate coach at Stanford
University, still maintains that his conduct did not merit a suspension).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
68. Id. at 262.
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The basis for their claim was that two articles had been removed from the
paper in violation of their right to free speech: the first discussed three
Hazelwood East High School students' experiences with pregnancy, and
the second discussed the impact of divorce on students at the school.69 The
principal, concerned that the text of the article revealed the pregnant girls'
identities and that the divorce story should have included the parent's
perspective, withheld two pages of the newspaper from publication.7 °
Upon review, the district court held that school officials may restrain
student speech when it is "'an integral part of the school's educational
function.,' 7 However, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held
that the student newspaper was not just part of a school-adopted
curriculum, but it was also a public forum because it operated as a medium
for student viewpoints.72 Consequently, the Court prohibited school
officials from censoring the content unless it substantially interfered with
schoolwork or discipline.73
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals decision,
holding that "[a] school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent
with its 'basic educational mission,' even though the government could not
censor similar speech outside the school. 74  The Court stated that the
newspaper was not a forum for public expression because it had always
been a part of the educational curriculum and a regular classroom activity.7 5
Although the Statement of Policy for the newspaper stated that "as a
student-press publication, [the newspaper] accepts all rights implied by the
First Amendment," according to the court, this just meant that school
officials would not interfere with First Amendment rights conferred on
69. Id. at 263; see also Brief for the Student Press Law Center et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (No. 86-836),
1987 WL 864179 (explaining that these articles were part of a two-page spread that focused on
current teen problems such as teenage marriage, runaways and the effects of divorce on children).
70. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 263-64; see id. at 264 n.1 (stating that the two pages also
included articles on teenage marriage, runaways, and juvenile delinquents, which the principal did
not find objectionable but simply deleted because they were on the same pages as the
objectionable articles).
71. Id. at 264 (quoting Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043, 1052 (E.D. N.Y. 1979)).
72. Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1372-73 (8th Cir. 1986) (stating
that the newspaper "was a 'student publication' ... [because] students chose the staff members,
determined the articles to be written and printed, and determined the content of those articles."
Further, "the newspaper was distributed to the school and the public.").
73. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 265.
74. Id. at 266 (citation omitted).
75. Id. at 270. But cf. Kuhlmeier, 795 F.2d at 1372 (explaining that the newspaper was a
public forum "because it was intended to be and operated as a conduit for student viewpoint,"
covering topics of student interest).
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76school-sponsored newspapers. 6 The newspaper was supposed to be a
"supervised learning experience" and thus school officials were authorized
to regulate its contents "in any reasonable manner.,
77
Additionally, the Court held that "the First Amendment [did] not
require schools to promote speech that conflict[ed] with the values held by
the school system., 78 Furthermore, the Court held that a student's right to
free speech must be construed "in light of the special characteristics of the
school environment., 79  As a result, the Kuhlmeier standard entitled
educators to exercise control over the content of student speech in school-
sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions were related to
"legitimate pedagogical concerns." 80 Kuhlmeier thus created yet another
standard, distinguishable from the standards established in Fraser and
Tinker.
8 1
After the Fraser and Kuhlmeier decisions, the veracity of the Tinker
decision has been called into doubt.8 2 Although the U.S. Supreme Court
has not expressly overruled Tinker, Fraser and Kuhlmeier have altered the
impact of its holding.83 According to Professor Chemerinsky, the Fraser
and Kuhlmeier decisions are more closely aligned with Justice Black's
dissent in Tinker.84  Justice Black argued that student speech is only
minimally protected by the First Amendment and courts should defer to
school officials when deciding which type of speech should be protected or
punished.85 Professor Chemerinsky argues that based on these subsequent
decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court "views schools as authoritarian
institutions and it therefore will greatly defer to school officials in student
76. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 269.
77. Id. at 270.
78. Servance, supra note 33, at 1229-30 (citing Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 270-71, wherein the
Court distinguished the issue in Tinker-whether the First Amendment requires a school to
tolerate particular student speech, from the issue in Kuhimeier-whether the First Amendment
required a school to promote a particular student speech).
79. Servance, supra note 33, at 1230 (citing Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 266).
80. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 273.
81. See id. at 272-73; see also Servance, supra note 33, at 1230 (stating that subsequent to
Kuhlmeier, "a school can regulate speech that not only materially and substantially disrupts the
school's educational function but can also regulate school-sponsored speech that does not meet
the standards that the school deems necessary.").
82. See Chemerinsky, supra note 16, at 541.
83. Id. (noting, that Tinker's narrow holding-that "students have a First Amendment right
to wear symbols... to communicate political messages, unless there is proof of a likely
disturbance to school activities"-remains undisturbed).
84. Id.
85. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 517 (1969) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
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speech cases. 86
Other commentators argue that the Fraser and Kuhulmeier decisions
did not diminish students' free speech rights but vested school officials
with the power to promote core First Amendment values by actively
directing the educational process. 87 They argue that the Kuhlmeier Court
gave schools discretion to disassociate themselves from objectionable
material in order to inculcate proper values and decorum. 88 Additionally,
they argue that Kuhlmeier and Fraser affirmed the proposition that students
retain free speech rights in the classroom and hallways of schools.89 They
concede, however, that certain factors, such as whether the speech was
school-sponsored, will determine whether the school can restrict the
student's speech.90
Irrespective of these views, the U.S. Supreme Court has created three
standards for student speech cases, which have set the stage for how
subsequent Internet-related student speech cases should be interpreted by
lower courts.
III. APPLICATION OF STANDARDS IN SUBSEQUENT INTERNET-RELATED
STUDENT SPEECH CASES
Lower state and federal courts have applied the Tinker, Fraser, and
Kuhlmeier standards when determining whether the First Amendment
protects a student's speech.91 In making this determination courts also
consider whether the speech occurred on or off campus, because off-
campus speech is afforded greater First Amendment protection than on-
campus speech.92 Courts also consider whether the speech constituted a
"true threat," because if the speech was deemed a true threat then it can be
restricted without violating the First Amendment.
93
The following subsections focus on four Internet-related student
86. Chemerinsky, supra note 16, at 541.
87. See Benjamin Wattenmaker, Note, Yeo v. Lexington: Abridging Rights of Publication in
the Student Press, 40 B.C. L. REv. 573, 598-99 (1999).
88. See id.
89. Lynda Hills, "Zero Tolerance "for Free Speech, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 365, 368 (2001).
90. See id.
91. See, e.g., J.S. II, supra note 21; Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d
779 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
92. J.S. II, supra note 21, at 864.
93. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707-08 (1969) (per curiam); see generally JS.
II, supra note 21, at 856-57 (discussing the factual background and holding of the Watts
decision).
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speech cases: J.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District,94 Beussink v.
Woodland R-IV School District," Emmett v. Kent School District No.
415,96 and Mahaffey v. Aldrich.97 These cases demonstrate how courts are
divided over the definitions of on-campus speech and true threat, and on
which standard-Tinker, Fraser, or Kuhlmeier-should be applied.
A. J.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District
Both the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania and the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania held in favor of the school district and against the
student in J.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District.
98
1. J.S.'s "Teacher Sux" Website
J.S., an eighth grade student at Nitschmann Middle School, created a
website using his home computer and posted it on the Internet sometime
before May of 1998.99 The website was neither sponsored by the school
nor part of a school project.100 It consisted of words, pictures, animations,
and sound clips.' 0 ' The website, entitled "Teacher Sux," contained
"derogatory, profane, offensive and threatening comments," primarily
directed towards J.S.'s algebra teacher, Mrs. Fulmer, and the school's
principal, Mr. Kartsotis.10 2 The website had a disclaimer, which warned
that by entering the website the visitor agreed: (1) not to tell the employees
of the school district about the website, (2) that the visitor was not a staff
member of the school district, and (3) that the visitor would not disclose the
website creator's identity nor try to cause him trouble.'
0 3
The most problematic part of the website was a page entitled "Why
Fulmer Should be Fired."' 4 This page stated in degrading terms that Mrs.
Fulmer should be fired because of her physique and disposition.'0 5 On
another web page there was an animated picture of Mrs. Fulmer with
94. J.S. II, supra note 21.
95. Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
96. Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
97. Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
98. J.S. I, supra note 21, at 850; see also J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 757 A.2d 412,
415 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000), a ffd, 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002), [hereinafter J.S. ].
99. J.S. II, supra note 21, at 850.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 851.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.; see also Richards & Calvert, supra note 10, at 1100.
105. See Richards & Calvert, supra note 10, at 1100.
THE NEED FOR A NEW, UNIFORM STANDARD
images from the "South Park' ' 10 6 cartoon which stated, "She's a bigger
b[itch] than your mom." 107 However, the most controversial component
was a caption entitled, "Why Should She Die?"'0 8 The text to the caption
told visitors to "[t]ake a look at the diagram and the reasons I gave, then
give me $20 to help pay for the hit man."' 0 9
Before long, students, faculty, and administrators, including Mrs.
Fulmer and Mr. Kartsotis, discovered the website."l 0 Believing that the
threats were real, the principal contacted the local police and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation."' Mrs. Fulmer claimed that after she viewed the
website, she suffered stress, anxiety, loss of appetite, and headaches.
12
She also applied for a medical leave for the remainder of the school year,
and three substitute teachers were required to fill her absence. 13 Further,
the principal claimed that due to J.S.'s website, staff and student morale
was at an all-time low. 1 14 Despite this, however, both the local police and
the Federal Bureau of Investigation declined to file charges against J.S. 1'
During this time, J.S. continued to attend classes and participate in
extra-curricular activities. 16 The school district did not ask J.S. to remove
the website; instead, J.S. removed the website on his own-about one week
after the principal became aware of the website.' 17 Additionally, during the
rest of the school year, the school district took no action to punish J.S. for
his website, nor did it refer J.S. for a psychological evaluation." 8  The
school district finally took action at the end of the school year by
106. See Katherine Blok, South Park Cartoon Makes Its Move Into Merchandising, J. REC.,
Aug. 31, 1998, at 1. "South Park" is an animated program which takes place in a fictional town,
South Park, Colorado, and its characters, Kyle, Stan, Kenny, and Cartman, are sometimes crude
and profane. Id. Since its debut in 1997, it has been regarded as one of the most popular cable-
network series. Id.
107. J.S. II, supra note 21, at 851.
108. Id.; see also id. at 851 n.4 (stating that there was a diagram that consisted of a picture
of Mrs. Fulmer and aspects of the picture were connected to statements, telling the visitor that
Mrs. Fulmer should die because she has a "zit" or "hideous smile").
109. Id. at 851.
110. Id. at 851-52.
111. Id. at 852.
112. Id.
113. J.S. II, supra note 21, at 852.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.; see also J.S. I, supra note 98, at 427 (Friedman, J., dissenting) ("The School
District did not decide to charge [J.S.] with any offense until July of 1998, and it was not until
August 5, 1998, that anyone from the School District notified [J.S.'s] parents about the web
site.").
2005]
78 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:65
suspending J.S. for three days, which was later increased to ten days." 
9
Thereafter, the school district voted to expel J.S.'
20
2. The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania's Decision
J.S., through his parents, sought review of the decision from the Court
of Common Pleas of Northampton County, which had affirmed the school
district's decision to punish J.S. for his website.' 21  J.S. subsequently
appealed the decision to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania on the
ground that the school had violated his First Amendment rights. 22  The
Commonwealth Court observed that there was prior case law, which
authorized schools to discipline students for conduct that took place off
school premises, so long as the conduct materially and substantially
interfered with the educational process. 23 The Commonwealth Court held
that J.S.'s speech occurred off-campus124 and that his conduct did cause a
material disruption because "a reasonable person could be both physically
and emotionally disturbed after viewing" J.S.'s website. 25  The
Commonwealth Court concluded that J.S.'s First Amendment rights had
not been violated due to the content of the website, the impact it had on
Mrs. Fulmer, and the effect it had on the school community.1
26
Judge Friedman, in her dissent, stated that J.S.'s First Amendment
rights had been violated because his website was not a true threat. 27 As
announced by the U.S. Supreme Court in Watts v. United States, 28 the First
119. J.S. I, supra note 98, at 415.
120. J.S. II, supra note 21, at 853 (explaining that the school district concluded that J.S.'s
request for twenty dollars to pay for a hit man was a threat and J.S.'s statements "caused an actual
harm to Mrs. Fulmer, as well as to other students and teachers").
121. J.S. I, supra note 98, at 412.
122. Id. at 417.
123. Id. at 421. Here, the Commonwealth Court cites Beussink v. Woodland R-IV School
District as support for the claim that courts have allowed schools to discipline students for off-
campus conduct, but the Beussink court suggested in a footnote that it considered Beussink's
speech on-campus, thereby triggering the Tinker substantial disruption test. See Beussink v.
Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1180 n.4 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
124. J.S. I, supra note 98, at 419.
125. See id. at 421 (stating that if a reasonable person saw a picture of his head severed and
dripping with blood on a website such a person would find that disturbing).
126. Id. at 422 ("Regrettably, in this day and age where school violence is becoming more
commonplace, school officials are justified in taking very seriously threats against faculty and
other students.").
127. Id. at 426 (Friedman, J., dissenting) (stating that the record showed that the school
district did not consider J.S.'s website a true threat).
128. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam).
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Amendment does not protect speech that constitutes a true threat. 129 Judge
Friedman observed that the proper means of evaluating whether a student's
website constitutes a true threat was to determine "whether a reasonable
person in [a] [s]tudent's position would foresee that viewers of the web site
would interpret it as a serious expression of intent to harm., 130 Applying
this "reasonable speaker test," Judge Friedman found that "a reasonable
eighth grader would not necessarily foresee that the web site ... would be
interpreted as a serious expression of intent to harm ... ." ,31 Additionally,
the school district's failure to take immediate action against J.S. indicated
that J.S.'s website was not a true threat. 132  Although Mrs. Fulmer was
personally affected by the website, "there was no evidence that the
[website] 'materially disrupt[ed] classwork,"' and therefore J.S.'s speech
should be constitutionally protected. 
133
An alternative approach to determining what types of speech
constitute a true threat was announced by the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit in Doe v. Pulaski County Special School District.134  The
Pulaski court used an approach known as the "reasonable recipient
approach.,135  Although both the reasonable speaker and reasonable
recipient approaches use an objective test, focusing on whether a
reasonable person would have interpreted the alleged threat as a serious
intent to harm; the two approaches diverge when determining from whose
129. See id. at 707-08.
130. J.S. I, supra note 98, at 426 (Friedman, J., dissenting) (articulating a standard that is
established by the Ninth Circuit in Lovell ex rel. Lovell v. Poway Unified School District, 90 F.3d
367 (9th Cir. 1996)); see Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 785 (E.D.
Mich. 2002) (explaining the definition of true threat used by the Sixth Circuit); see also J.S. II,
supra note 21, at 857 (explaining that to determine whether certain speech constituted a true
threat based on the reasonable speaker approach, the Ninth Circuit in Lovell considered the
factual context of the alleged threats, the surrounding events, the listeners' reactions, and whether
the threats sounded equivocal, conditional, and immediate).
131. J.S. I, supra note 98, at 426 (Friedman, J., dissenting); see id. at 428 (pointing out that
J.S. did not intend for school officials to view the website and that members of the intended
audience who visited the website had these reactions: "[M]akes me crack up every time I read it."
and "Go here anytime you need a good laugh."); see also id. at 428 n.7 (noting that none of the
students who were interviewed by the school indicated that J.S. intended to harm anyone).
132. J.S. I, supra note 98, at 426 (Friedman, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 426 n.1 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969)); see id. at 428 ("[W]e must strike a delicate balance between recognition of the dangers
that, unfortunately, exist in our schools today and the reality that children, no matter how
sophisticated their knowledge may be, are nevertheless children, immature and naive."); see also
id. at 428 n.6. (stating in regard to J.S.'s website: "This type of sick humor can be found in some
of today's popular television programs, such as South Park.").
134. Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616 (8th Cir. 2002).
135. Id. at 622-23.
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viewpoint the statement should be interpreted. 136 As mentioned previously,
the reasonable speaker approach focuses on whether a "reasonable person
standing in the shoes of the speaker would foresee that the recipient would
perceive the statement as a threat .... , 137 On the other hand, the
reasonable recipient approach asks whether "a reasonable person standing
in the recipient's shoes would view the alleged threat" as a serious
expression of intent to cause present or future harm.138 The Eighth Circuit
adopted several factors to determine how a reasonable recipient would
view the purported threat, such as the listener's reactions and whether the
threat was conditional.
139
The Pulaski court recognized that some circuits, like the First Circuit,
have rejected the reasonable recipient approach, because there is a risk that
a speaker's First Amendment rights could be abridged simply because the
recipient had an unusual sensitivity unbeknownst to the speaker.
140
Ultimately, however, the Pulaski court adopted the reasonable recipient
approach, stating "[t]he debate over the approaches appears.., to be
largely academic because in the vast majority of the cases the outcome will
be the same under both tests."'
' 41
Judge Friedman's dissent presents an alternate and opposing view that
J.S.'s speech was constitutionally protected. 142 Instead of concluding that
J.S.'s speech was not protected by the First Amendment due to its crude
nature and Mrs. Fulmer's reaction, Judge Friedman considered all the
circumstances: the school's response to the speech, the listeners' responses,
and the speaker's perspective.1
43
136. See id. at 622; see also Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 785
n.5 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (discussing the conflicting approaches).
137. Pulaski, 306 F.3d at 622.
138. Id.; see also United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 925 (8th Cir. 1996).
139. See Pulaski, 306 F.3d at 623 (stating that other factors, not considered in Lovell,
include whether the speaker had a history of making threats against the alleged victim and
whether the recipient had a reason to believe that the speaker had an inclination to be violent).
140. See id. at 623 (explaining that the First Circuit rejected the reasonable recipient
approach because it feared that it would not promote "the robust and open public debate
envisioned by the First Amendment").
141. Id. ("The result will differ only in the extremely rare case when a recipient suffers from
some unique sensitivity and that sensitivity is unknown to the speaker.") (emphasis added).
142. See J.S. I, supra note 98, at 426 n.1 (Friedman, J., dissenting) (quoting Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)) (stating in effect that J.S.'s website should
have been protected by the First Amendment).
143. See id. at 428-29 (applying the reasonable speaker approach to the facts).
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3. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's Decision
J.S. appealed the Commonwealth Court's decision to the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, and argued that the school district had violated his
First Amendment rights.' 44  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court first
considered whether the website constituted a true threat. If deemed a true
threat, the speech would not be protected by the First Amendment and the
school district would be authorized to discipline J.S. 145 However, even if
J.S.'s speech was not a true threat, the school was authorized to discipline
J.S. if the speech "disrupted school work or invaded the rights of others."'
146
After employing the reasonable speaker approach and considering the
totality of the circumstances, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that
J.S.'s statements did not constitute a true threat.147 The court held instead
that the website and the speech contained therein, when "taken as a whole,
was a sophomoric, crude, highly offensive and perhaps misguided attempt
at humor or parody.' 48
Due to the U.S. Supreme Court's failure to readdress the scope of
students' First Amendment rights since Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier,149 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's ability to clearly define
the constitutional protection afforded to Internet-related student speech was
complicated. 150 The court determined that if J.S.'s speech was considered
on-campus--a status which would entitle J.S. to less First Amendment
protection -'-other factors drawn from the three prior U.S. Supreme Court
decisions on student speech had to be considered: the form of the speech,
i.e. political or lewd; the speech's level of disruption; the setting of the
speech; and whether the speech was school-sponsored.
52
144. See J.S. II, supra note 21, at 853.
145. See id. at 856 ("[lIf the speech authored by J.S. constituted a true threat, as defined by
the case law, it receives no constitutional protection. Unprotected by the First Amendment, the
School District would have the authority to discipline J.S. for such speech and our inquiry would
end.").
146. Id. at 856 ("However, even if not a 'true threat,' the School District might not have
violated J.S.'s constitutional right to free speech by disciplining him if the speech was otherwise
protected, but it in some fashion disrupted school work or invaded the rights of others.").
147. Id. at 859-60 (explaining that the majority based its decision after finding that the
website was not intended for school officials to view, that J.S. had not made similar comments in
the past to Mrs. Fulmer, and that it was unclear whether Mrs. Fulmer had any reason to believe
that, when compared to his peers, J.S. was more inclined to engage in violence).
148. Id. at 859.
149. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
150. See J.S. II, supra note 21, at 863-64.
151. Id. at 864.
152. Id. (articulating factors based on the Tinker, Fraser, and Kuhlmeier decisions).
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Ultimately, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that there was a
sufficient nexus between the website and the school campus to hold that
J.S.'s speech was on-campus speech.153 The court went on to declare that
speech is on-campus speech when it "is aimed at a specific school and/or
its personnel [and] is brought onto the school campus or accessed at school
by its originator."'
' 54
The court also had to decide which standard to apply-Tinker,
Fraser, or Kuhlmeier 55 The court observed that student speech cases that
do not involve the Internet have been analyzed using either the Tinker or
Fraser standards or both.156 However, Internet-related student speech cases
have typically been reviewed using the Tinker standard. 57 Ultimately, the
J.S. II court used both the Tinker and Fraser standards.
58
In applying the Fraser standard, the court found that J.S.'s
punishment for using lewd and offensive language conformed with the
Fraser Court's decision, which permitted schools to punish students for
lewd or offensive speech that "undermine[d] the basic function of a public
school."'1 59  Deferring to school authority, the court stated, "[I]t is for
school districts to determine what is vulgar, lewd or plainly offensive."',
60
When applying Tinker, the majority determined that the website
caused a substantial disruption to the operation of the school. 6 ' The
disruption was considered substantial because Mrs. Fulmer was unable to
153. Id. at 865; see also id. at 864 n. 11 (noting that purely off-campus speech could be
subject to punishment by the school district if the substantial disruption test was met).
154. Id. at 865 (explaining that the speech was considered on-campus because (a) the
website was accessed by J.S. at school and shown to another student, (b) the website was
intended for students to view, and (c) the subjects of the website were Mrs. Fulmer and the
principal).
155. See id. at 865-66 (explaining that because of the type of speech, the unique setting of
the speech, and the manner in which the speech was disseminated, the application of the Tinker,
Fraser, and Kuhlmeier standards was difficult; unlike the speech in Tinker, Fraser, and
Kuhlmeier, J.S.'s speech was not a political speech, it did not take place at a school assembly, and
the speech was not school sponsored.).
156. See J.S. II, supra note 21, at 867.
157. Id. at 866; see, e.g., Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (E.D.
Mo. 1998); Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
158. J.S. II, supra note 21, at 867-68.
159. Id. at 868 ("The statements made in the 'Teacher Sux' web site are no less lewd, vulgar
or plainly offensive than the speech expressed at the school assembly and held subject to
discipline in Fraser.") (noting further that issues exist as to the applicability of Bethel School
District No. 403 v. Fraser to JS. II but that ultimately Fraser was applicable because Fraser was
about the unique needs of the school environment and concern for the educational mission of the
school); see also Servance, supra note 33, at 1228 ("[P]ublic education has as its primary mission
the goal of preparing students to participate in our democratic society.").
160. JS. II, supra note 21, at 868 n.13.
161. Id. at 869.
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complete the school year after viewing the website, and her absence
adversely affected the educational environment, requiring three substitute
teachers to replace her.162 According to the majority, the school district's
punishment of J.S. comported with the First Amendment.'
63
J.S. I and J.S. II indicate that courts differ in their application of the
three standards for Internet-related student speech cases. These cases also
show that having to decide whether a student's website is constitutionally
protected speech is a difficult decision, fraught with many important
considerations.
B. Beussink v. Woodland R-IV School District
In Beussink v. Woodland R-IV School District,164 a high school
student named Brandon Beussink created and posted an Internet
homepage. 165 There was no indication that Beussink created his homepage
using school resources or facilities. 166 Beussink's homepage used vulgar
language to criticize school officials. 167  Beussink's friend, in an act of
retaliation, intentionally accessed Beussink's homepage while at school and
showed it to the high school's computer teacher. 168 The computer teacher
informed the principal about Beussink's homepage, and the principal, upset
that the homepage had been displayed in one of the classrooms,
immediately disciplined Beussink. 169 Other students viewed the homepage
on campus that same day but only because a teacher allowed them
access. 170
162. Id. at 869 ("The web site posted by J.S. in this case disrupted the entire school
community-teachers, students and parents."). Contra Richards & Calvert, supra note 10, at
1113-14 (stating that having to find substitute teachers was not a disruption, but rather was just
the "replacement of one teacher by other teachers").
163. J.S. II, supra note 21, at 869.
164. Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
165. Id. at 1177; see David Hudson, Cyberspeech,
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/speech/studentexpression/topic.aspx?topic=cyberspeech
(last visited Sept. 29, 2005) [hereinafter Hudson 1] (stating that Beussink's homepage contained
vulgar language that criticized the principal, faculty, and other aspects of the school).
166. Beussink, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1177.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1177-78 (explaining that besides Beussink's friend, only one other student was
in the classroom, and Beussink's friend did not access the homepage at school at Beussink's
behest, authorization, or with his knowledge); see Tuneski, supra note 33, at 154 (noting that
besides Beussink's friend viewing the website, the website caused no disruption).
169. Beussink, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1178. Such disciplinary action was taken despite
Beussink's contention that he created the homepage simply to voice his opinion and had no
intention that the website be accessed on campus. See id. at 1177.
170. Id. at 1179.
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The principal initially suspended Beussink for five days but later
increased his suspension to ten days.' 7' Further, after the principal told him
to remove the website, Beussink removed his homepage when he arrived
home from school. 7 2  The high school also had a policy that lowered
"students' grades in each class by one letter grade for each unexcused
absence in excess of ten days."'' 73 Beussink had already accumulated prior
unexcused absences, and by the time he had served his suspension, he was
failing all of his classes. 
174
The Beussink court applied the Tinker standard, stating that if the
speech did not materially interfere with the school's operations then the
school's prohibition would be overruled. 175 The court applied the Tinker
standard because it found that Beussink's speech occurred on-campus, and
not in the context of a school-sponsored event. 176 The court held that there
was no significant disruption to school discipline, even though students
discussed the incident. 77  The court further noted that the principal
disciplined Beussink because he was upset by the homepage, but added that
"[d]isliking or being upset by the content of a student's speech is not an
acceptable justification for limiting student speech under Tinker."'
178
The court concluded that Beussink's speech was constitutionally
protected because, although his speech might have been unpopular, it did
not interfere with school discipline. 79  The court stated that provocative
speech, like Beussink's, deserved constitutional protection because
171. Id.
172. Id.; see also Tuneski, supra note 33, at 154.
173. Beussink, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1179.
174. Id. at 1179-80; see id. at 1181 (noting that "[tihe loss of these credits [would]
potentially delay Beussink's graduation with his class at the end of this school year").
175. Id. at 1180; see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513
(1969).
176. See Beussink, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1180 n.4; see also Tuneski, supra note 33, at 154
(explaining that by applying the Tinker standard the Beussink court suggests that Beussink's
speech occurred on-campus); see also Servance, supra note 33, at 1236 (arguing that the on-
campus, off-campus distinction is tenuous because even though Beussink created his website off-
campus and did not use any school resources to create his website, the Tinker analysis was
triggered because another student accessed the website on campus without his permission).
177. Beussink, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1181; see Tuneski, supra note 33, at 154 (noting that "by
applying the substantial disruption test, the Beussink court clearly suggested that had the
defendant's website caused a stir on-campus, the school may have been justified in punishing him
for what would otherwise be protected speech").
178. Beussink, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1180. The principal testified: "When I viewed [the
website] and it was explained that it had been seen by other students, yes, sir, I was upset." Id. at
1178. The principal also testified that he had not spoken to any other students before making the
decision the discipline Beussink. Id.
179. Id. at 1182.
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unpopular speech invites censure and the First Amendment was designed to
protect such speech.1
8 0
C. Emmett v. Kent School District No. 415
Emmett v. Kent School District No. 415181 involved a high school
student, Nick Emmett, who posted a web page on the Internet, which he
created from his home without using the school's resources or time.1 82 The
website contained disclaimers telling visitors that the website was not
sponsored by the school and that its purpose was solely for
entertainment. 183 The problematic part of the website was where Emmett,
inspired by his creative writing class, wrote mock obituaries of his friends
and posted them on the Internet.' 84 The website also asked visitors to vote
on who would "die"-in other words, who would be the subject of the next
mock obituary. 185  Students, faculty, and administrators discussed the
website at the high school. 86 A television news story then characterized
Emmett's website as containing a "hit list," even though those words did
not appear on the website. 187  Further, although Emmett immediately
removed the website after the news story aired, the school placed him on
emergency expulsion, which it later modified to a short-term suspension of
five days.
188
The U.S. District Court considered the Fraser and Kuhlmeier
standards and found that Emmett's speech was neither "at a school
assembly as in Fraser nor was it in a school sponsored newspaper as in
Kuhlmeier."'' 8 9 For this reason, the court held that Emmett's "speech was
entirely outside the school's supervision or control."' 90 In other words, the
speech was off-campus speech and therefore entitled to greater First
Amendment protection.' 9' The court ruled in favor of Emmett because
180. Id.
181. Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
182. Id. at 1089 (noting that Emmett had a 3.95 grade point average and was the co-captain
of his basketball team).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Emmet v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1089 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1090.
190. Id.; see Servance, supra note 33, at 1239-40.
191. Servance, supra note 33, at 1239-40 (stating that the Emmett court determined that the
website was created off-campus and thus none of the traditional tests applied).
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there was no indication that the website was intended to harm anyone, nor
was there any evidence that people felt threatened by the website.1
92
Although the Emmett court recognized that in a post-Columbine era school
districts had reason for caution, the court concluded that the subjects of the
mock obituaries were friends of Emmett, and these friends did not feel
threatened by his website.'
93
D. Mahaffey v. Aldrich
Mahaffey v. Aldrich194 is a case where Joshua Mahaffey and his friend
created a website "'for laughs,' because they were bored. 1 95 The website
was entitled "Satan's web page" and listed "people I wish would die" and
"people that are cool. ' 19 6 The website stated, "SATAN'S MISSION FOR
YOU THIS WEEK: Stab someone for no reason then set them on fire ....
Killing people is wrong don't do It [sic] .... PS: NOW THAT YOU'VE
READ MY WEB PAGE PLEASE DON'T GO KILLING PEOPLE AND
STUFF THEN BLAMING IT ON ME. OK?"' 97 Mahaffey admitted that a
high school computer might have been used to create the website.198 After
the school discovered the website, he was suspended.' 99
Before applying Tinker, the district court first inquired whether the
speech occurred on school property.2 °0  The court determined that
Mahaffey's statement, regarding his possible use of the high school's
computers, was equivocal and therefore, Mahaffey's speech occurred off-
campus.20 ' The court stated, however, that if Mahaffey's conduct had
occurred on-campus it would have applied the Tinker standard; but
according to the court, even under this standard there was no evidence that
the website interfered with the school's operations or that any other
student's rights were invaded.20 2 Then, the court used the reasonable
speaker approach and concluded that a reasonable person in Mahaffey's
192. Emmett, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 1090 ("The defendant, however, has presented no evidence
that the mock obituaries and voting ... were intended to threaten anyone, did actually threaten
anyone, or manifested any violent tendancies whatsoever.").
193. Id.
194. Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
195. Id. at 781.
196. Id. at 781-82.
197. Id. at 782.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 782-83 (stating that the school recommended expelling him but this
recommendation was later withdrawn).
200. Mahaffey, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 783-84.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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place would not foresee that the statements were a serious expression of
intent to harm.2 °3 The court held that regulation of Mahaffey's conduct
violated his First Amendment rights because the speech was considered
off-campus speech and there were no signs of disruption to the school.204
The cases discussed in this section show that courts are divided on
important issues: whether school officials are constitutionally authorized to
regulate Internet-related student speech that is created off-campus, whether
school officials may regulate off-campus speech that is either accessed on
campus by the speaker or other students,20 5 and to what extent the Tinker,
Fraser, and Kuhlmeier standards are applicable.
IV. A SEPARATE STANDARD Is NEEDED FOR INTERNET-RELATED
STUDENT SPEECH
The cases previously discussed show that Internet-related student
speech is given inconsistent treatment by the courts.2 0 6 While some courts
primarily focus on the Tinker standard, other courts focus on both the
Fraser and Tinker standards.20 7 Amidst this confusion is some courts'
adherence to the off-campus, on-campus distinction, which is inapplicable
when dealing with Internet-related student speech.20 8 This section lists
several reasons for the need of developing one, uniform standard for
Internet-related student speech cases that do not involve school sponsorship
of the student's Internet activity.
203. Id. at 786; see also Richards & Calvert, supra note 10, at 1106 (explaining that the
court held that the website was not a true threat because of Mahaffey's disclaimer, Mahaffey only
listed students' names but did not threaten the students, and Mahaffey said that the website was
only for laughs).
204. Mahaffey, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 786. Contra Servance, supra note 33, at 1242-43
(proposing a "harmful impact standard" and arguing that the Mahaffey court should not have
simply assumed that Mahaffey did not tell others about the website, but rather should have
provided proof of whether other students actually felt threatened by the website).
205. Hudson I, supra note 165.
206. See discussion supra Part II.
207. See, e.g., Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1180 (E.D. Mo.
1998) (applying the Tinker standard only); J.S. II, supra note 21, at 867-68 (applying both Tinker
and Fraser standards).
208. See discussion supra Part III. However, the issue of whether the off-campus, on-
campus distinction applies to cases that involve school sponsorship of the student's Internet-
related activity is beyond the scope of this comment.
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A. Discrepancies Between Courts' Use of the Tinker, Fraser, and
Kuhlmeier Standards
Because the U.S. Supreme Court has not revisited student speech
issues since 1988209 and has not created a separate standard for Internet-
related student speech cases, courts have differed on which standard to
apply in Internet-related student speech cases.2  The majority in J.S. v.
Bethlehem Area School District,2 11 though acknowledging that applying
any of the three U.S. Supreme Court standards was problematic because
JS. II was factually distinguishable, applied both the Tinker and Fraser
standards. 212 On the other hand, the court in Beussink v. Woodland R-IV
School District2 3 only applied the Tinker standard.214 Further, unlike the
J.S. II court, which applied the Fraser standard because J.S.'s speech was
lewd and offensive,2 15 the Emmett court did not apply the Fraser standard
because Emmett's speech was not at a school assembly.216 As long as these
three standards exist and courts disagree over which standard to apply,
217
courts will remain divided on decisions involving Internet-related student
speech until the U.S. Supreme Court steps in and develops a new, uniform
standard.
2 18
1. Discrepancies May Lead to Unconstitutional Restrictions on Student
Speech
Without a clear, new standard, courts such as the J.S. II court will
continue to misinterpret the Tinker standard, thereby unconstitutionally
209. The last main student speech case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court was Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Chemerinsky, supra note 16, at 528 (stating
that there have been few rulings concerning student speech even though many lower courts have
dealt with this topic).
210. See Chemerinsky, supra note 16, at 542-43; see also discussion supra Part Il.
211. J.S. II, supra note 21.
212. Id. at 867-68.
213. Beussink v. Woodland R-1V Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
214. Id. at 1180.
215. J.S. II, supra note 21, at 868.
216. Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
217. See discussion supra Part III.
218. See Shannon P. Duffy, State, Federal Courts Differ on Student Discipline Over
Electronic Speech: Western District Court Judge Reverses Suspension; Pa. Supreme Take Up
Web Site Case, PA. L. WKLY., April 16, 2001, at 5 (discussing the different outcomes state and
federal courts reach when determining whether student Internet speech is constitutionally
protected); see also discussion supra Part III (discussing a state case that held student speech
unprotected and discussing federal cases that held student speech protected).
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restricting student speech.2 19 To illustrate a misapplication of the Tinker
standard, two law professors have argued that Mrs. Fulmer had a thinned-
skin reaction to J.S.'s website and thus her reaction should not have been
construed as a substantial and material disruption of the school's
operations. 220 Another legal expert echoed this view, stating that "[w]e all
just have to remember that you need a thick[-]skin .... It's a matter of
common sense. You have to decide what's a real threat and what's a joke.
If you take absolutely every threat seriously, you'll end up missing the
serious ones because your resources will be exhausted., 221  In J.S. II,
although the school had to find substitute teachers to replace Mrs. Fulmer,
this should not constitute a disruption of the school environment because it
was merely "a replacement of one teacher by other teachers. 222
2. Student Speech Enables Students to Appreciate Democratic Values
Discrepancies and misinterpretations in this area of law may
potentially inhibit student speech, thereby preventing students from
developing a capacity to be critical of higher authority, which is an
important aspect of living in a democratic society where individuals retain
political sovereignty.223 Individuals must be able to think for themselves in
order to exercise their political rights in a democratic society.224 Moreover,
if schools fail to teach students the value of free expression, then these
students will fail to appreciate the participatory character of a democratic
society and will instead feel alienated, thinking the government is being
arbitrary.
225
219. See Richards & Calvert, supra note 10, at 1113 (arguing that the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania misinterpreted the substantial disruption test in J.S v. Bethlehem School District,
807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002)).
220. Id. at 1113 ("It turns Tinker on its head to think that a teacher's absence from school
can constitute a material disruption of the educational process in school.").
221. Duffy, supra note 218, at 15 (quoting Larry Frankel, the executive director of the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)).
222. Richards & Calvert, supra note 10, at 1114 (arguing that the impact of the J.S. I
court's decision was that anytime a teacher reacts adversely to a student's speech then such a
reaction will constitute a substantial and material disruption).
223. SAUNDERS, supra note 9, at 228 (quoting Amy Gutmann).
224. See id.
225. Id. at 248 (quoting Betsy Levin); see also Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S.
675, 681 (1986) ("These fundamental values of 'habits and manners of civility' essential to a
democratic society must, of course, include tolerance of divergent political and religious views,
even when the views expressed may be unpopular." (quoting C. BEARD & M. BEARD, NEW
BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 228 (1968))).
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B. Without a New, Defined Standard, Student Speech Might be Further
Curtailed as Courts Justify These Restrictions Based on the Columbine
Tragedy
Courts have recognized, in their decisions of Interet-related student
speech cases, the growing violence among students today and often cite the
Columbine tragedy.226 In J.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District,
227
although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not find J.S.'s website a true
threat, it acknowledged that school violence was an all too common event,
especially after the horrific event at Columbine High School. 8  Even
though the courts do not base their decisions solely on the Columbine
tragedy, it factors into their decision-making.229 In reality, events like
Columbine, although very tragic, are rare.230 According to the Department
of Justice's Bureau of Justice Statistics and the Department of Education's
National Center for Education Statistics, between July 1, 1992 and June 30,
2000, youth between the ages of five to nineteen were at least seventy
times more likely to be murdered away from school than at school.231 It
has also been reported that from 1995 to 2003, the percentage of students
who reported being victims at school declined from ten percent to five
percent.232 Moreover, children are exposed to music, movies, and video
games, and their speech is merely a reflection of their exposure to these
mediums, and not necessarily an indication that they want to commit
violent acts.233
Accentuating this judicial misconception is the generation gap
between judges and students-many judges do not understand popular
culture and thus are unable to grasp the student's perspective.234 Two law
226. Richards & Calvert, supra note 10, at 1093 (stating that the Columbine tragedy has
impacted the schools and the courts).
227. J.S. II, supra note 21.
228. Id. at 860.
229. Richards & Calvert, supra note 10, at 1110.
230. Id.; see supra note 15. Contra Louis John Seminski, Jr., Tinkering with Student Free
Speech: The Internet and the Need for a New Standard, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 165, 169-70 (2001)
("[T]he fact is that these occurrences are more than isolated incidents and such dangerous
Internet-related conduct is not limited to only these deadly threats.").
231. DEVOE, supra note 6, at 6.
232. Id. at 14-15.
233. See, e.g., J.S. I, supra note 98, at 428 n.6 (Friedman, J., dissenting) (stating that the
humor found on J.S.'s website can be found on today's television shows like "South Park"); see,
e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 689 n.2 (1986) (Blackmun, J., and
Brennan, J., concurring) ("[Fraser's] speech was no more 'obscene,' ... than the bulk of
programs currently appearing on prime time television or in the local cinema.").
234. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 692 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that Fraser was in
a better position to determine whether his peers would be offended, rather than having a group of
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professors have argued that judges are so generationally removed from
popular teen culture that they have difficulty understanding the culture.235
Instead of recognizing that teens are immersed in this culture and are
inundated with violent and profane imagery every day, judges are focused
on uncommon, tragic events like Columbine.236 For example, Eminem, a
popular rap artist among teenagers, has produced songs that contain
"violent, misogynistic, and homophobic lyrics," and yet he has sold
millions of albums.237 Judges need to remember that children are
impressionable and that although their speech may at times appear crude
and even violent, they are really imitating artists such as Eminem or
popular teen culture in general. 8
C. There Are Different Approaches to Determining Whether a Student's
Internet Speech is a True Threat
Another reason for the necessity of a new standard regarding Internet-
related student speech cases is that courts have differed on whether to use
the reasonable speaker approach or the reasonable recipient approach, a
critical decision in determining whether a student's speech constitutes a
true threat.239 The two approaches, when applied, can produce different
results. 240  For example, in J.S v. Bethlehem Area School District,241 the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania used the reasonable speaker approach
242
and came to the conclusion that J.S.'s website was not a true threat.
2 43
Judge Friedman, applying the same approach in the J.S. I dissent,
older judges make that determination); see also Richards & Calvert, supra note 10, at 1110-11.
235. Richards & Calvert, supra note 10, at 1110.
236. Id. ("Many judges simply ignore the pervasive social reality of music, movies, and
violent video games in which teens develop, while they concentrate instead on a few random
school shootings to justify their opinions.").
237. Id. at 1110-11.
238. See generally id. (discussing the impact of popular culture on teenagers).
239. Compare J.S. I, supra note 98, at 426 (Friedman, J., dissenting) (stating that the proper
test is the reasonable speaker approach), with Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d
616, 622 (8th Cir. 2002) (stating that the court will view an alleged threat using the reasonable
recipient approach).
240. See Pulaski, 306 F.3d at 623 (explaining that the First Circuit has rejected the
reasonable recipient approach because there is a risk that a speaker's First Amendment rights
could be abridged).
241. J.S. II, supra note 21.
242. J.S. II, supra note 21, at 857-58 (discussing two cases- Lovell ex rel. Lovell v. Poway
Unified School District and In the Interest of A.S.-that apply the reasonable speaker approach,
and concluding that these cases serve as guidance on the issue of whether J.S.'s speech
constitutes a true threat).
243. Id. at 859-60.
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concluded that a reasonable eighth grader in J.S.'s position would not think
the website was a true threat.2" Conversely, if one were to apply the
reasonable recipient approach to that case, J.S.'s speech would likely
constitute a true threat and lose First Amendment protection, because Mrs.
Fulmer, the recipient, would have believed that J.S.'s website showed that
he planned to hurt her presently or in the future.245 Because these two
approaches produce conflicting consequences, a result that threatens a
student's right to speak freely, the U.S. Supreme Court must set a new
standard that helps establish which approach should be used.
D. The On-Campus and Off-Campus Distinction is Inapplicable in Internet
Student Speech Cases
Some courts have used the on-campus, off-campus speech distinction
based on the belief that if the speech is considered off-campus speech, it is
less likely that the student's speech disrupted the school environment.246
However, some courts, like the court in J.S. v. Bethlehem Area School
District,247 define on-campus speech in such an expansive manner that
practically any Intemet-related student speech will be deemed on-campus
speech in the future.248 In a concurring opinion in JS. II, Justice Zappala
states that "the fact that a web site is merely accessed at school by its
originator is an insufficient basis" to call the speech on-campus speech.249
The standard formulated by the J.S. II majority is too broad. Under this
standard a student's speech would be considered on-campus speech even
though the student created the website in the privacy of his own home, and
the student accessed his website at school just for a few minutes.
As another example, in Beussink v. Woodland R-IV School District,
250
even though Beussink created his website at home, the court considered his
speech on-campus simply because another student, without his permission,
244. J.S. I, supra note 98, at 426.
245. Richards & Calvert, supra note 10, at 1114 (stating that Mrs. Fulmer testified she was
afraid someone would try to kill her after she saw the website).
246. See Servance, supra note 33, at 1234-35 (stating "that where speech occurs off
campus, the nexus between speech and school disruption diminishes, and student rights to free
speech increase").
247. J.S. II, supra note 21.
248. See id. at 865 ("we hold that where speech that is aimed at a specific school ... is
brought onto the campus or accessed at school by its originator, the speech will be considered on-
campus speech.").
249. Id. at 870 (Zappala, J., concurring) (explaining that deeming a student's speech as on-
campus speech just because the website was accessed at school is inappropriate).
250. Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
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accessed his website on-campus.2 5' Additionally, although courts generally
protect off-campus speech, the standards are so malleable that a court could
possibly justify punishing a student even if the speech actually occurred
off-campus. 2
Furthermore, the off-campus and on-campus speech distinction
should not be applied because the Internet is a borderless medium. 53 The
Internet differs from other traditional mediums of expression, such as
flyers, newspapers, and public speeches, for several reasons: (1) it is
pervasive, (2) it allows users to disseminate information to millions of
people immediately and easily, and (3) it can be accessed anywhere. 4
One commentator points out the futility of pinpointing a website's
geographical location because "[g]iven [the Internet's] inherently different
mode of expression, the old distinctions physically demarcating authority
over student speech to on or off-campus are not adequate, especially as
applied to children in a school setting.' 255 Deeming some speech as on-
campus merely because the website's creator or other school official
accessed the website on-campus is misguided 25 6 because then all Internet-
related student speech would be considered on-campus speech, since the
Internet is ever-present and easily accessible.257
E. A Separate Standard is Needed to Protect Students' Free Speech on the
Internet
Because the Internet is a unique medium 258 that allows people to
anonymously express their views, thereby encouraging free speech and
ideas, a separate standard is needed to ensure that that the anonymous
expression of students' views over the Internet will be protected. 259 The
251. Servance, supra note 33, at 1236; see also Beussink, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1177-78.
252. See Tuneski, supra note 33, at 153; Hudson I, supra note 163 ("[S]ome school officials
have suspended students for their off-campus [Internet speech] that lampooned or criticized
school officials.").
253. See Servance, supra note 33, at 1235-36.
254. Id. ("Internet content is not limited by geography.").
255. Id. at 1235; id. at 1237 ("Speech should not be defined by the computer on which it
originates. Courts should instead apply the principle that is intuitive to most Internet users:
Internet speech resides in cyberspace, which is borderless and exists wherever there is a
connection to the Internet.").
256. See, e.g., id. at 1236.
257. Id. at 1235 ("Not only is Internet speech ever-present but one can also quickly and
easily disseminate its content to an infinite number of people.").
258. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997) ("The Internet is a 'unique and wholly new
medium of worldwide human communication."').
259. See Chemerinsky, supra note 16, at 545 (stating that courts have a duty to ensure that
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Internet has made anonymous communication much easier.260  This
anonymity has motivated people to select the Internet as their medium of
expression because they believe that anonymity will prevent official
retaliation, social ostracism, and an invasion of privacy. 261  The cases
discussed in Part III indicate that students are concerned about these
issues.262 This anonymity enables students to explicitly state their thoughts
and allows them to use the Internet not only as a cathartic expression of
their frustrations and artistic sensibilities, but also as a diversion.263 One
author stated that students have made negative comments about faculty for
decades, but it is now a controversial issue simply because the Internet has
made such comments more easily accessible and harder to remove.264
According to another author, speech on the Internet must be protected
because it is the most significant tool in changing society and shaping the
way people think about social and political issues.265  He stated, "The
protections of the First Amendment must necessarily extend to this
revolutionary 'phenomenon' in order to ensure every citizen of his or her
individual rights and to foster the growth and improvement of our
schools punish student speech only when constitutionally permitted).
260. Noah Levine, Note, Establishing Legal Accountability for Anonymous Communication
in Cyberspace, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1526, 1528 (1996); see id. at 1531 (explaining that "a three-
judge panel in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania affirmed[,] '[as] the most participatory form of
mass speech yet developed, the Internet deserves the highest protection from governmental
intrusion"'); see also Reno, 521 U.S. at 850 (stating that 40 million people used the Internet in
1996 and that this number is expected to mushroom to 200 million by 1999).
261. Jay Krasovec, Comment, Cyberspace: The Final Frontier, for Regulation?, 31 AKRON
L. REv. 101, 126 (1997).
262. See, e.g., J.S. II, supra note 21, at 851 (containing a disclaimer that said in effect the
visitor would not report his website to school officials); see Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch.
Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1177 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (stating that Beussink had no intention of
having his website accessed at school); see also Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp.
2d 1088, 1089 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (including a disclaimer that said the website was not
sponsored by the school); see also Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779,
782 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (stating that Mahaffey did not want anyone to do something and then
blame it on him).
263. See discussion supra Part III.A. 1 (indicating that the website was an opportunity for
J.S. to express his frustrations for having Mrs. Fulmer as his teacher and an opportunity to be
creative); see, e.g., Emmett, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 1089 (explaining that Emmett's website was
inspired by his creative writing class); see, e.g., Mahaffey, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 781 (stating that the
students created the website because they were bored and wanted some laughs); see also
Beussink, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1177 (giving Beussink an opportunity to voice his criticisms about
school officials); see also Krasovec, supra note 261, at 144-45 ("The sharing of ideas ... on
virtually every social and political issue are all fostered by the ability of the Internet-user to feel
secure, for whatever reason, in not revealing his or her identity.").
264. Duffy, supra note 218 (stating that the ease of setting up websites and sending emails
have elevated sophomoric humor to new levels).
265. Krasovec, supra note 261, at 124.
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government and society., 266  Student expression over the Internet enables
people to think differently about social and political issues, and at the very
least, allows students who find other traditional modes of expression risky
or invasive to express themselves freely.267
F. The U.S. Supreme Court Should View Congressional Laws Regulating
the Internet as A Signal That It Should Establish A Unique Standard For
Internet-Related Student Speech
Due to the heightened use of the Internet and the emergence of
Internet-related crimes, 268 state and federal regulation of the Internet has
increased.269 Congressional regulation of the Internet should signal to the
U.S. Supreme Court a need for a standard that exclusively governs Internet-
related student speech cases. One such regulation is the Controlling the
Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing ("CAN-SPAM")
Act.
270
Congress enacted the CAN-SPAM Act on January 1, 2004271 as a
response to the plethora of unsolicited commercial e-mail
advertisements,272 otherwise known as "SPAM," that people were
273receiving.  Principally, this regulation affects businesses engaged in e-
mail advertisements.274 Congress passed the proposal because it found a
substantial government interest in regulating SPAM. 275  The CAN-SPAM
Act aims to prevent fraudulent SPAM and ensures that recipients have the
266. Id. at 124-25; id. at 125 (explaining that some advantages of anonymous online
communication are that anonymity promotes increased communication among large audiences
and society might ultimately benefit by sharing delicate information).
267. See id. at 124; see, e.g., id. at 126 (stating that people choose to express themselves
over the Internet because of the anonymity it provides).
268. See Krasovec, supra note 261, at 104-05, 113 (stating that the Internet has an
estimated ten percent increase in users every month and noting that some examples of crimes over
the Internet are those involving child pornography and hate crimes).
269. Id. at 118 ("Therefore, with the increased use of computers and the Internet in the
participation of such [Internet-related] crimes, the perception for the need for regulation has also
increased resulting in both state and federal legislation attempting to regulate the Internet.").
270. 15 U.S.C. § 7704 (2003).
271. Jonathan Bick, Staying Within the Limits of the CAN-SPAM Act, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 1,
2004, at 24.
272. Id. (stating that that "Spam persists because it is simple and cost-effective").
273. See Sameh I. Mobarek, The CAN-SPAM Act of 2003: Was Congress Actually Trying to
Solve the Problem or Add to It?, 16 LoY. CONSUMER L. REV. 247, 256 (2004).
274. Richard E. Wiley & Rosemary C. Harold, Contentious Times in a Shifting Landscape,
in PRAC. L. INST., 2 COMMUNICATIONS LAW 2004 109, 241 (2004).
275. Mobarek, supra note 273, at 257.
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276right to exclude future SPAM from the same source. The Act also
targets SPAM "that contains materially false or misleading header
information., 277 Additionally, the CAN-SPAM Act requires warning labels
for sexually explicit content.278
The CAN-SPAM Act is significant for three reasons: (1) Congress
fashioned a regulation that did not aim to limit free speech per se, but
rather intended to limit speech that would damage the recipient; 279 (2)
Congress recognized a problem and tailored a remedy specifically to
address that problem; 280 and (3) Congress developed a uniform law
regarding commercial e-mail advertisements that preempted more than
thirty inconsistent state laws on SPAM. 281 The U.S. Supreme Court should
follow Congress' path and construct a standard that aims not at limiting
students' free speech rights, but rather aims at protecting both students and
schools from disruptive speech. The Court too, must recognize that
remedies must be specifically tailored to meet Internet-related problems; in
this circumstance, judicial standards must be tailored so that Internet-
related student speech will not be unduly curtailed. Furthermore, by
following in Congress' footsteps, the Court can develop a uniform,
consistent standard that would supersede the varied standards that have
been developed by the Court in the past-the Tinker, Fraser, and
Kuhlmeier standards.282
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has protected Internet speech in the
past.283 It held in Reno v. ACL U 84 that the Communications Decency Act
of 1996 ("CDA"),285 which prohibited the knowing transmission of
indecent material to those under the age of eighteen,286 was unconstitutional
276. Id. at 257-58 (explaining that the Act focused on the narrow segment of Spam
messages that perpetrated a type of fraud).
277. Id. at 258.
278. Bick, supra note 271.
279. Erin E. Marks, Comment, Spammers Clog In-Boxes Everywhere: Will the CAN-SPAM
Act of 2003 Halt the Invasion?, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 943, 949 (2003) (stating that
Congress's aim with regard to the CAN-SPAM Act was to "curb the widespread exploitation of
the email system").
280. See id. at 952 ("The CAN-SPAM Act will beneficially serve to deter spammers from
sending fraudulent or misleading email messages.. .
281. Wiley & Harold, supra note 274, at 125.
282. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
283. See generally Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (holding that the Communications
Decency Act was an unconstitutional restriction on speech).
284. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
285. See 47 U.S.C. § 223(a), (d) (Supp. III 1994), invalidated by Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S.
844 (1997).
286. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 859.
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under the First Amendment because it was an overly broad content-based
restriction on speech.z87 Reno protected adult speech, holding that the
CDA "effectively suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have a
constitutional right to receive and to address to one another., 288  On the
other hand, Professor Chemerinsky points out that, with respect to student
speech, the U.S. Supreme Court in Bethel School District No. 403 v.
Fraser289 and Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier290 stressed minimal
protection for student speech and instead emphasized judicial deference to
the expertise of school officials.29'
Due to the foregoing, the U.S. Supreme Court needs to develop a new
standard for Internet-related student speech so that student speech rights
will not be unjustly restricted. Professor Chemerinsky notes that because
school officials will want to suppress student speech because it makes them
feel uncomfortable292 or because they dislike it, the judiciary has the
responsibility of ensuring that this discomfort does not become the basis for
punishing students.293
V. A NEW STANDARD FOR INTERNET-RELATED STUDENT SPEECH CASES
CAN BALANCE THE COMPETING INTERESTS OF STUDENTS AND SCHOOL
OFFICIALS
A new standard can ensure an appropriate balance between the two
competing interests present in Internet-related student speech cases-
protecting a student's individual free speech rights and protecting schools
from violent student behavior.294 The new standard amalgamates the legal
doctrines previously described.
287. See id. at 874 ("Given the vague contours of the coverage of the [CDA], it
unquestionably silences some speakers whose messages would be entitled to constitutional
protection.").
288. See id. ("That burden on adult speech is unacceptable .... ) (emphasis added). But
see Seminski supra note 230, at 180 (stating generally, without distinguishing between adult and
student Internet speech, that the Reno Court held "Internet speech was protected speech under the
Constitution") (emphasis added).
289. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
290. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
291. Chemerinsky, supra note 16, at 539; see also supra text accompanying note 16.
292. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 278 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(stating that the principal violated the First Amendment by excising student articles that did not
"materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline," but rather
simply because they were "personal" and "sensitive").
293. See Chemerinsky, supra note 16, at 546.
294. Servance, supra note 33, at 1237 ("It is true that schools must not become enclaves of
totalitarianism, but they must not be powerless to confront harassers either.").
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First, it is important to emphasize that this new standard should only
apply to Internet-related student speech cases that do not involve school-
sponsored events or activities.295 Rather, this new standard should apply to
cases like J.S. v. Bethlehem Area School Distric2 96 and Beussink v.
Woodland R-IV School Distric2 97 where the school neither sponsored the
students' websites nor showcased the students' websites at school-
sponsored events. 298 However, if the school sponsors the Internet-related
student speech or includes it as part of a school-sponsored activity, then the
Fraser and Kuhlmeier standards should apply, and schools should be able
to exercise control over the activities they sponsor.299
Alternatively, some argue that having to determine which speech is
part of the school curriculum and which speech is outside the school
curriculum is an impractical distinction. 300  To illustrate this point, one
author gives the hypothetical example of a teacher who instructs a student
to email a pen pal, and this student communicates on subjects beyond the
scope of the teacher's instructions. 30' Although upon first glance, it
appears that this situation obscures the school-sponsored distinction, in
actuality one can easily determine that this is a school-sponsored activity.30 2
The example falls within the definition of "school-sponsored" activity
because the student emailed the pen pal only after the teacher instructed the
student to do so.303 Thus, any subsequent emails sent during the duration
of the class project can still be attributed to the school, even if the student
discusses subjects outside the scope of the teacher's instructions.30 4
295. The definition of "school sponsorship" as used in this comment is defined narrowly,
that is, a student's Internet speech is considered "school sponsored" if the student's Internet
speech was presented at a school event, such as the school assembly in Fraser, or was part of a
school-sponsored activity, such as an on-line student newspaper. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v.
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 16, at 538, (quoting Justice White
who said that Kuhlmeier concerned the question of the "educators" authority over school-
sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that students,
parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the
school") (emphasis added).
296. J.S. II, supra note 21.
297. Beussink v. Woodland R-[V Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
298. See, e.g., J.S. II, supra note 21; see also Beussink, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175.
299. See discussion supra Part II.B-C.
300. Jennifer Kathleen Swartz, Beyond the Schoolhouse Gates: Do Students Shed Their
Constitutional Rights when Communicating to a Cyber-Audience?, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 587, 601
(2000).
301. See id.
302. See supra note 295 and accompanying text.
303. See supra note 295 and accompanying text.
304. See Chemerinsky, supra note 16, at 538 (quoting Justice White's statement that to
determine whether the First Amendment requires schools to promote a student's speech depends
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Once a court determines that the Fraser and Kuhlmeier standards do
not apply because the case only involves non-school sponsored Internet-
related student speech, a court must then decide whether the speech
constitutes a true threat under the reasonable speaker approach. °5 When
using this approach, a court should consider the totality of the
circumstances, including the listeners' reactions, the speaker's intentions,
the school's reaction,0 6 and whether the threats sound equivocal.30 7 When
looking at the speaker's intentions, a court should consider several factors:
the student's academic standing, the student's level of social activity, 30 8 the
student's psychological history, and the student's willingness and
promptness to remove the Internet speech in question.30 9
If a court decides that the speech did not constitute a true threat, it
should apply the Tinker test.310  When applying the Tinker test,311 a court
should keep in mind that the student's Internet speech must substantially
disrupt the operations of the school; for example, merely having to
substitute teachers would not be a material disruption.31 2 Further, in
determining whether a student's Internet speech materially or substantially
disrupted the operation of the school or invaded the rights of others,
313
courts should consider that overly broad generalizations are not sufficient.
on whether the expressive activities bear the imprimatur of the school).
305. See discussion supra Part III.A.2 (discussing the reasonable speaker approach in the
true threat analysis and explaining that if the speech is considered a true threat then the speech is
not constitutionally protected).
306. Lovell ex rel Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 372 (9th Cir. 1996)
(citing United States v. Gilbert, 884 F.2d 454, 457 (9th Cir. 1989) and United States v. Mitchell,
812 F.2d 1250, 1255 (9th Cir. 1987)).
307. Id.
308. See, e.g., Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1089 (W.D. Wash.
2000) (indicating that Emmett was a star student and basketball player); see also J.S. II, supra
note 21, at 852 (noting that during the controversy over his website, J.S. continued to attend
classes and extracurricular activities).
309. See, e.g., JS. I, supra note 98, at 428-29 (Friedman, J., dissenting) (stating that if J.S.
was a true threat the school district should have required J.S. to get a psychological evaluation
and by not doing so, it was shirking its responsibility); see also JS. II, supra note 21, at 852
(stating that J.S. removed his website on his own about a week after the principal became aware
of the website); see also Beussink, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1179 (stating that Beussink removed his
website after the principal told him to do so).
310. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) (explaining
the Tinker substantial disruption test); see also JS. II, supra note 21, at 856 (explaining that even
if the speech is not considered a true threat, one must consider whether the speech constituted a
substantial disruption or invaded the rights of others).
311. The suggested new standard clarifies the definition and scope of the Tinker standard.
312. See Richards & Calvert, supra note 10, at 1113 (pointing out that teacher's absence
from school is not a material disruption).
313. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513 (articulating the substantial disruption test).
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For example, describing the school's atmosphere as somber would not
constitute a substantial disruption.3 4  Instead, courts should require
evidence that a specific person was affected by the speech.315  Courts
should also realize that being upset by the content of a student's speech,
without first looking at the context of the speech, is not an appropriate
justification for restricting that speech.316 Also, a recipient's thin-skinned
reaction to the speech will not be an acceptable justification either.
31 7
Judges must keep in mind that public schools cannot be "enclaves of
totalitarianism" 31 8 and that students possess fundamental rights that states
must respect.319 Moreover, from a policy perspective, courts should refrain
from immediately deferring to school authorities due to the fear of events
like Columbine.320  Rather, courts should first ask whether the speech in
question is merely a reflection of popular culture that pervades today's
321society. If so, the courts should give greater protection to the student'sspeech.322
A. The Inapplicability of the Fraser Standard to Internet-Related Student
Speech Cases
The Tinker standard, instead of the Fraser or Kuhlmeier standards,
should be used in non-school sponsored Internet-related student speech
cases for several critical reasons. First, the U.S. Supreme Court in Bethel
School District No. 403 v. Fraser323 held that schools had the authority to
314. Compare J.S. II, supra note 21, at 869 (indicating that, due to J.S.'s website, the
atmosphere of the entire school was as though "a student had died" and "there was a feeling of
helplessness"), with J.S. I, supra note 98, at 428 (Friedman, J., dissenting) (mentioning that some
students found J.S.'s site humorous).
315. JS. II, supra note 21, at 869.
316. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508 (stating that undifferentiated fear is not enough to
overcome a student's First Amendment rights); see also JS. I, supra note 21, at 857 (listing
factors considered in true threat analysis, which can also be used to look at the context of the
student's speech: the surrounding events; the listeners' reactions; and whether the threats sounded
equivocal, conditional, and immediate).
317. See Richards & Calvert, supra note 10, at 1113-14 (discussing Mrs. Fulmer's thin-
skinned reaction to J.S.'s speech); see also id. at 1114 (emphasizing that private remedies are
available for speech that one might find hurtful, and that Mrs. Fulmer took advantage of this
private remedy by suing J.S.'s parents for negligent supervision of their son and recovered
$500,000).
318. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
319. Id.
320. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
321. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
322. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
323. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
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punish speech that they considered threatening or highly offensive-
sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd speech.324 However, as the foregoing
discussion has emphasized, the Internet is a unique medium that allows
students to express themselves freely. 325 The anonymity that the Internet
provides, the ease with which messages can be sent, and its overall
accessibility 326 allow students to express themselves freely, particularly
when traditional modes of expression seem less ideal. 327 It is unjust to hold
students who use the Internet as a cathartic medium of self-expression to
the Fraser standard.328 The Fraser case involved circumstances that were
factually distinct from the J.S. II line of cases: 329 no Internet was involved,
Fraser was speaking at a school-sponsored event, and there was more
accountability because Fraser was not speaking anonymously.33 °
Furthermore, Fraser knew who his audience was-he was speaking directly
to an assembly of his fellow students 33 '-whereas the audience for an
Internet communication is potentially global.332 Additionally, because
Internet-related student speech is often a reflection of popular culture, 333 it
would be inappropriate to have judges who are removed from popular teen
culture decide what is considered lewd or indecent.334  Justice Stevens
argued in his dissent that Fraser could better determine whether his peers
would be offended by a sexual metaphor, rather than a group of judges
3,000 miles away.335
324. See Servance, supra note 33, at 1228 (citing Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685); see also Fraser,
478 U.S. at 685-86 ("[I]t was perfectly appropriate for the school to disassociate itself to make
the point to the pupils that vulgar speech and lewd conduct is wholly inconsistent the
'fundamental values' of public school education.")
325. See discussion supra Part IV.E.
326. See Levine, supra note 260, at 1528; see also Servance, supra note 33, at 1235-36
(describing the Internet as pervasive and easily accessible).
327. See supra discussion Part IV.E; see also Krasovec, supra note 261, at 126 (stating that
people have chosen the Internet as their medium of expression due to the anonymity it provides).
328. See supra notes 262-63 and accompanying text; see also Servance, supra note 33, at
1228 (citing Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685) (articulating the Fraser standard).
329. See Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (E.D. Mo. 1998);
Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2000); Mahaffey ex rel.
Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
330. See discussion supra Part II.B.
331. See Fraser, at 677-78.
332. See Swartz, supra note 300, at 602.
333. See J.S. I, supra note 98, at 428 n.6 (Friedman, J., dissenting) (stating that J.S.'s humor
can be found on popular television shows like "South Park").
334. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
335. See Fraser, 487 U.S. at 692 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
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B. The Inapplicability of the Kuhlmeier Standard to Internet-Related
Student Speech Cases
Similarly, the Kuhlmeier standard is inappropriate for non-school
sponsored Internet-related student speech cases because the cases discussed
in this Comment are not connected to any school-sponsored activities or
events.33 6 Unlike the cases discussed in Part III, Hazelwood School District
v. Kuhlmeier337 created a standard where schools could exercise control
over the content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive
activities. 338 Further, Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser339 involved a
student's speech at a school-sponsored event. 340  Due to these critical
differences, neither the Kuhlmeier nor Fraser standards are applicable to
Internet-related student speech cases, such as J.S. v. Bethlehem Area School
District,341 where there is no school-sponsorship of the websites.
342
C. The Tinker Standard Is Most Applicable to Internet-Related Student
Speech Cases
The Tinker standard is the most applicable standard for Internet-
related student speech cases that do not involve school sponsorship,
because it is both broad and flexible enough to balance the needs of a
student's right to self-expression and the school's need to maintain an
orderly and safe educational environment.3 43 The substantial disruption test
enables school officials to punish a student for speech that "materially
disrupts classwork or involves the substantial disorder or invasion of the
rights of others. 344 For example, suppose the following circumstances:
student X posts a website that makes profane or abusive comments against
student Y, the context of these comments indicates that student X is
serious, and student Y does not feel free to leave the house due to these
336. See discussion supra Part III (discussing various Interet-related student speech cases).
337. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
338. See id. at 273. Cf Swartz supra note 300, at 601-02 (explaining, in part, that one of
the rationales for the Kuhlmeier decision was that educators should be able to protect underage
readers from certain material, but because the Internet reaches a global audience this reasoning
behind Kuhlmeier is eliminated).
339. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
340. Id. at 678.
341. J.S. II, supra note 21.
342. See discussion supra Part III.
343. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) (stating
that students may express their opinions as long as they do not materially interfere with school
discipline or with the rights of others).
344. Id.
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comments. Under this scenario, school officials would be able to punish
student X using the Tinker substantial disruption test.
34 5
Additionally, although the Tinker standard was formulated during the
Vietnam War era, it remains an appropriate standard today.347  The
Tinker Court had the foresight to recognize that it is important to protect a
student's right to free speech, because future leaders must be trained in an
arena where "a robust exchange of ideas" is promoted.348 The Tinker Court
also recognized that a student's speech should not be restricted merely to
avoid "unpopular viewpoints., 349  The Tinker Court's considerations
remain highly relevant today. Because people can express themselves over
the Internet quickly and easily 3 5 and engage in a participatory form of mass
speech,351 students' expressions over the Internet deserve some protection.
Moreover, although some would argue that Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District3 52 is factually distinct from the
current cases on Internet-related student speech, it is actually analogous to
them. In Tinker, students wore black armbands to symbolize their
opposition to the Vietnam War.3 53 Similarly, in Emmett v. Kent School
District No. 415,354 Emmett's website, which created mock obituaries of
his friends, expressed his creative thoughts.355 In J.S. v. Bethlehem Area
School District,356 although J.S.'s website could be considered crude or
vulgar, it expressed his criticisms of the principal and Mrs. Fulmer.357
Even though the Internet-related student speech cases discussed in this
article did not involve black armbands or the Vietnam War, they all
involved web postings that articulated these students' feelings about issues
they considered relevant.358
345. See id.
346. Id. at 503.
347. Contra Seminski supra note 230, at 177 ("[T]he courts will continue to apply the dated
Tinker standard to these cases.") (emphasis added).
348. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512.
349. Id. at 509.
350. See discussion supra Part IV.E; see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (stating
that the Internet has experienced extraordinary growth-the number of host computers, devices
that store and relay information, has increased from 300 in 1981 to about 9,400,000 in 1996).
351. See Levine, supra note 260, at 1531.
352. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
353. Id. at 504.
354. Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, (W.D. Wash. 2000).
355. Id. at 1089.
356. J.S. 1H, supra note 21.
357. Id.
358. See id.; Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (E.D. Mo. 1998);
Emmett, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 1088; Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779 (E.D.
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Overall, this new standard ensures a student's First Amendment rights
will not be restricted due to inconsistent standards and arbitrary distinctions
between off-campus and on-campus speech. 35 9  The new standard is
protective of both student speech and the school's interest in maintaining
order.360 By incorporating the Tinker test, the new standard ensures that if
a student's Internet-related student speech is violent or offensive enough to
substantially disrupt the school's operations or violate the rights of others,
the school may suspend or expel the student.361
VI. APPLICATION OF THIS NEW STANDARD TO J.S. V. BETHLEHEM AREA
SCHOOL DISTRICT
If the court had applied the new standard articulated in the preceding
discussion, the ultimate result in JS. v. Bethlehem Area School District
3 62
would have been different, but fair.363 First, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania would have had to decide whether any school sponsorship
was involved in the posting of J.S.'s website.364 After determining that the
school did not sponsor the website 365 and that J.S.'s speech did involve the
Internet, the new standard would be applied.366 Then, the court would have
to determine whether J.S.'s speech constituted a true threat by examining
the totality of the circumstances.36 7 The court would have concluded that
J.S.'s website did not constitute a true threat because there was some
indication that the students, the intended audience, thought the website was
humorous.3 68 Other factors indicating that J.S.'s website was not a true
threat were (1) the speaker's intention to make a humorous website
criticizing faculty at his school,369 (2) the school's delay in punishing J.S.
Mich. 2002).
359. See discussion supra Part IV.A-D.
360. But see Seminski, supra note 230, at 183-84 (suggesting a new standard that creates a
lessened expectation of protective free speech in schools due "in light of the current problems and
violence in schools").
361. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513 (articulating the Tinker standard).
362. J.S. 11, supra note 21.
363. See discussion supra Part.V.
364. See discussion supra Part.V.
365. J.S. II, supra note 21, at 850.
366. Id.; see discussion supra Part.V.
367. See J.S. II, supra note 21, at 857 (reviewing Lovell ex rel. Lovell v. Poway Unified
Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 372 (9th Cir. 1996)).
368. See, e.g., JS. I, supra note 98, at 428 (Friedman, J., dissenting) (noting that a visitor to
J.S.'s website "cracked up" every time the student saw the website).
369. See J.S. II, supra note 21, at 851 (using animation, sound clips, and images from
"South Park" for the website).
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for his behavior,370 (3) the equivocal nature of the threats,37' and (4) J.S.'s
removal of the website on his own initiative after the principal became
aware of the website.
372
At this point, because J.S.'s website was not a true threat, the court
would apply the Tinker standard.3 73 Under the Tinker standard, the court
would have found that the website did not materially disrupt classwork
since the disruption had to be substantial; Mrs. Fulmer's absence merely
required the substitution of one teacher for another one.374 The court would
have to also consider some caveats when applying the Tinker standard:
whether the website affected a specific person, whether the recipient was
upset by the content of the speech without considering its context, and
whether the recipient merely had a thin-skinned reaction to the speech.375
Under the new standard, the court would have found that J.S.'s website did
not substantially disrupt the operations of the school or invade the rights of
others because (1) the principal's assertion that student morale was at an
all-time low due to the website was a generalized assumption, 376 (2) J.S.
meant the website to be humorous,377 and (3) Mrs. Fulmer had a thinned-
skinned reaction to the website. 378 Finally, from a policy perspective, the
court would have found that J.S.'s speech should be protected because it
was a reflection of popular culture; for example, J.S. used images from
"South Park" on his website. 379  Thus, under this new standard, J.S.'s
speech would have been protected.
VII. CONCLUSION
The courts have applied the Tinker, Fraser, and Kuhlmeier standards
370. See id. at 852, 860.
371. See id. at 859 (stating that the threats were equivocal because it was unclear whether
Mrs. Fulmer had any reason to believe that J.S. had an inclination to engage in violence).
372. Id. at 852.
373. See id. at 860-61; see also discussion supra Part.V.
374. J.S. I, supra note 98, at 426 n. 1 (Friedman, J., dissenting) (citing Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)) (stating that there was no evidence that the website
materially disrupted class work); see also Richards & Calvert, supra note 10, at 1113-14 (stating
that having to find substitute teachers was not a disruption, but rather is was just the replacement
of one teacher by other teachers).
375. See discussion supra Part.V.
376. J.S. II, supra note 21, at 852.
377. See J.S. I, supra note 98, at 428 (Friedman, J., dissenting) (pointing out that those who
visited the website had these reactions: "[M]akes me crack up every time I read it," and "Go here
anytime you need a good laugh.")
378. See discussion supra Part V.A.1.
379. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
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in an inconsistent manner.380 Without a uniform standard, there is a strong
possibility that Internet-related student speech will continue to be curbed in
favor of school districts.381
The new standard articulated in Part V ensures that students will not
be punished for expressing their thoughts and beliefs when their speech is
deemed harmless and there is no substantial disruption.38 2 As technology
continues to advance and the Internet becomes further ingrained in our
lives, 383 the U.S. Supreme Court must adapt and provide guidance to the
lower courts and to the public on an area of law that remains murky at best.
Sandy S. Li*
380. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
381. See discussion supra Part IV.A.1; see also Chemerinsky, supra note 16, at 539
(stressing that since Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser and Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhimeier, the U.S. Supreme Court has lessened the protection for student speech and deferred to
the authority and expertise of school officials).
382. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513 (1969); see also discussion supra Part IV.
383. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 851 (stating that the methods of Internet
communication and information retrieval methods over the Internet are constantly evolving); id.
at 850 (stating that 40 million people used the Internet in 1996 and that this number is expected to
mushroom to 200 million by 1999); see also Seminski supra note 230, at 165 n.1 (stating that the
number of host computers had increased from 9.4 million hosts in 1996 to 36.7 million hosts in
July 1998 (citing ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Pa. 1999))).
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